

**ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟ
ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ
ΑΘΗΝΩΝ**



ATHENS UNIVERSITY
OF ECONOMICS
AND BUSINESS



THE ADAPTATION INVESTMENT CYCLE: THE MISSING LINK FOR BRIDGING THE REGIONAL ADAPTATION GAP IN EUROPE

PHOEBE KOUNDOURI
MARIA CHOURDAKI
KONSTANTINOS DELLIS
KIT ENGLAND

Working Paper Series

26-08

March 2026

Department of International and European Economic Studies

The Adaptation Investment Cycle: The Missing link for bridging the regional adaptation gap in Europe

Phoebe Koundouri (pkoundouri@aueb.gr)^{1,2,3,4}, Maria Chourdaki
(m.chourdaki@athenarc.gr)^{1,4}, Konstantinos Dellis (kdellis@aueb.gr)^{1,4}, Kit England
(kitengland@fastmail.com)⁵

¹*School of Economics, Department IEES, and AE4RIA.ReSEES Research Laboratory, Athens University of Economics and Business, 76, Patission Str., 10434, Athens, Greece*

²*Department of Earth Sciences and Peterhouse, University of Cambridge, The Old Schools, Trinity Ln, Cambridge CB2 1TN, UK;*

³*AE4RIA.SDU ATHENA Information Technology Research Center, 52 Aigialeias, Marousi, 15125, Athens, Greece;*

⁴*UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) Global Climate Hub, Athens, Greece*

⁵*Paul Watkiss Associates, Oxford, UK*

Abstract

Europe, as the fastest warming continent, faces elevated climate risks coupled with a climate adaptation finance gap, defined as the difference between the costs of achieving an adaptation target and the amount of finance available for adaptation (UNEP, 2024). The EU needs to invest almost €70 billion per year in climate adaptation up to 2050 (Monteleone et al., 2026). However, current funding relies heavily on public sources, highlighting the urgent need for private sector involvement (CPI, 2023). Regions and cities in the EU face barriers in their effort to muster financial resources to translate adaptation strategies into tangible projects to promote climate and socioeconomic resilience. The Adaptation Investment Cycle (AIC), developed in the HEU Pathways2Resilience project, is a six-step process designed to help regions overcome barriers to financing climate adaptation by

26 offering a step-by-step approach that builds local capacity and bridges gaps between planning and
27 implementation. This paper maps the steps of the AIC to common adaptation finance barriers -
28 economic, financial, awareness, behavioral, and institutional-, highlights their impact on raising and
29 leveraging capital to strengthen regional resilience and assesses innovative financial sources and
30 instruments tailored to regional needs. Finally, we emphasize concise frameworks for sub-national
31 adaptation finance and contribute to the literature on regional resilience.

32 **Key words:** climate finance; climate adaptation; adaptation finance barriers; Adaptation Investment
33 Cycle (AIC); public sector; investors

34

35 **1. Introduction**


36 Despite financial flows for climate accelerating over the past decade, adaptation finance challenges
37 remain significant, as the adaptation finance gap persists (UNEP, 2025). By 2035, developing
38 countries alone could face adaptation costs of US\$310–365 billion per year, roughly 12–14 times
39 higher than current international public adaptation finance of US\$26 billion per year (Figure 1).
40 Meanwhile, private adaptation finance remains marginal at US\$3.5–5.7 billion per year, representing
41 just 1–2 % of estimated needs, despite the fact that the private sector could realistically cover 15–20
42 % of priority adaptation investments, particularly in agriculture, water, and infrastructure (UNEP,
43 2025). Recent estimates from the European Commission place the annual adaptation investment
44 needs for Europe at almost 70 billion, with about €30 billion dedicated to infrastructure, €21 billion
45 for ecosystems and €12 billion for food security (European Commission, 2026). The total global
46 social and economic costs of inaction under business-as-usual warming could reach at least US\$1,266
47 trillion (Buchner et al., 2023), highlighting the massive gap between current investments and the scale
48 of the impacts of climate challenge (CPI, 2024).

49

50

51

52 **Figure 1. Comparison of adaptation financing needs, costs and international public adaptation finance**
 53 **flows in developing countries (constant 2023 prices).**



54

55 Source: *Watkiss, P., Butera, B., Canales, N., Chapagain, D., & Pauw, P. (2025). Adaptation finance gap,*
 56 *Chapter 4, in Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on empty (p.14).*

57

58 Adaptation finance is underpinned by a multitude of barriers. These barriers collectively hinder the
 59 effective mobilization of financial resources for sub-national authorities (cities and regions) which
 60 are at the forefront of adaptation actions. Even when financial resources are secured, barriers persist
 61 that impede the effective leveraging of these funds for successful adaptation projects (Koundouri et
 62 al., 2023). To this day most adaptation projects tend to be developed reactively and are of incremental
 63 nature. Financing anticipatory and transformational adaptation is harder, as it involves more
 64 challenges, due to uncertainty and lower rates of return, most of them discounted from the not so near
 65 future. It is therefore likely that the public sector will be required to pay for most of the near- and
 66 long-term planned, anticipatory adaptation actions (Watkiss & Frontier Economics, 2022).

67 European subnational adaptation strategies place limited emphasis on addressing financing barriers,
 68 which constrains access to the financial resources required to implement effective adaptation
 69 measures. While multiple funding mechanisms exist at both EU and national levels, their accessibility
 70 remains limited for many regional and local actors, particularly smaller municipalities and local

71 communities, due to persistent knowledge gaps, governance shortcomings, administrative
72 complexity, restrictive eligibility criteria, and bureaucratic hurdles. Furthermore, inequitable access
73 to climate change adaptation strategies can exacerbate existing social vulnerabilities and enhance
74 disparities in the impacts of climate change (Zahnow et al., 2025). Many scholars and practitioners
75 argue that the development of succinct regional resilience investment plans catalyse adaptation
76 actions by addressing most of the key challenges associated with adaptation finance (England et al.,
77 2026).

78 This paper suggests a shift beyond the typical focus on incremental risk management, building on the
79 EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change under Horizon Europe (HEU), which aims to make
80 European regions, cities, and local authorities climate-resilient by 2030, with a key objective of
81 supporting 150+ regions and communities in accelerating their transformation toward resilience. In
82 line with this goal, it presents the Adaptation Investment Cycle (henceforth AIC) developed for the
83 Pathways2Resilience (P2R) HEU project, launched to help achieve this target by creating 150
84 climate-resilient regions and local authorities by 2030. The AIC develops the financial aspects of a
85 Climate Resilience Strategy from the identification of adaptation needs and barriers to finance all the
86 way to the implementation and monitoring of efficient adaptation projects. We conceptually link the
87 specific tasks of the AIC to the most common adaptation finance barriers based on the relevant
88 literature and the feedback from the first Cohort of P2R regions.

89 The second section of the paper summarizes and classifies barriers to adaptation finance, while
90 section 3 presents the analytical framework of the AIC and its mapping to these barriers. Section 4
91 presents three succinct cases of common adaptation finance barriers and the relevance of specific AIC
92 tasks. Section 5 concludes.

93
94
95
96
97
98

99 **2. Classification of Barriers to Adaptation Finance**

100 Klein et al. (2014) provide the definition of barriers to adaptation finance as the “*factors that make it*
101 *harder to plan and implement adaptation actions. Adaptation constraints restrict the variety and*
102 *effectiveness of options for actors to secure their existing objectives, or for a natural system to change*
103 *in ways that maintain productivity or functioning. These constraints commonly include lack of*
104 *resources (e.g., funding, technology, or knowledge) institutional characteristics that impede action*
105 *or lack of connectivity and environmental quality for ecosystems”*. Adger, et al. (2007) note that
106 adaptation is constrained by a range of interrelated barriers, including technological limitations,
107 financial restrictions, cognitive and behavioral gaps, socio-cultural factors, knowledge and
108 information deficits and institutional or policy fragmentation.

109 Thus, these barriers often impede the translation of high adaptive capacity into tangible adaptive
110 actions. Although barriers are often discussed in the literature as discrete determinants of adaptive
111 capacity, they rarely act in isolation (Klein et al., 2014). Multiple barriers can significantly reduce the
112 range of adaptation options and lock the mobilisation of funding and finance for adaptation.

113 We identify five broad categories of barriers following Koundouri et al. (2023) and Watkiss and
114 Frontier Economics (2022).

115

116 **2.1 Economic / Market Barriers**

117 **2.1.1 Public good characteristics / Positive externalities**

118 Adaptation actions by default encompass public good characteristics. This implies that the social and
119 economic benefits from adaptation exceed the financial ones and accrue to more than one entity (firm,
120 individual, group), making it hard to appropriate them privately. Private investors typically ignore
121 these non-market benefits and focus only on incremental cash flows, leading to rational, but
122 significant underinvestment by the private sector in these areas. This mechanism also contributes to
123 a moral hazard issue as private actors expect the public sector to bear most of the cost (Khan, M. R.,
124 & Munira, S., 2021; Bisaro, A., & Hinkel, J., 2018).

125 The non-market costs and benefits of adaptation measures, such as ecosystem protection, natural and
126 social capital, health interventions, and land-use changes are under-researched (Adger et al., 2007).
127 As a result, it is extremely difficult to determine the return on investment for non-market public goods,
128 making it even harder to attract private sector investment. Non-market sectors are therefore a low
129 priority for the private sector unless specifically incentivized by the government (Kállay & Takács,
130 2023).

131 For example, ecosystem-based adaptation is very attractive from a social welfare (public) perspective
132 because of the large environmental benefits arising from positive externalities (e.g., GHG emission
133 reductions, benefits to well-being through the enhancement of ecosystem services). However, such
134 adaptation investment is less attractive financially from a private sector point of view
135 (ECONADAPT, 2017), meaning financial returns do not reflect the full value of undertaking the
136 activity (Druce et al., 2016). Positive externalities might also appear in the form of technology
137 spillovers, where a project generates lessons that are useful to other actors but do not provide
138 additional revenues to the investor (UNEP, 2016).

139

140 **2.1.2 Fiscal limitations**

141 Despite the escalating risks posed by climate change, adaptation continues to be deprioritized within
142 public budgets, particularly in comparison with sectors traditionally viewed as more urgent or
143 politically salient, such as defence and energy security. Public budgets are already overstretched as
144 many governments face high debt burdens and increased scrutiny on debt sustainability, which limits
145 their fiscal space for (inter alia) long-term adaptation investments (European Commission, 2026).
146 This poses a significant challenge as public finance remains the dominant source of adaptation
147 funding, with estimates suggesting at around 98% of tracked adaptation finance originates from
148 public actors (CPI, 2023). The adverse effect is exacerbated by the reluctance of the private sector to
149 engage in adaptation funding as a result of many other barriers discussed in this section (see for
150 example 2.1.1, 2.2.1 and 2.2.3).

151 Having said that, domestic adaptation finance is hard to track and rarely integrated into formal
152 government systems. Public financial management frameworks often lack climate tagging, meaning
153 that adaptation spending is not systematically planned or budgeted (CPI, 2024).

154

155 **2.1.3 Misaligned incentives**

156 In the context of adaptation, markets tend to under-allocate resources because prices do not fully
157 reflect climate risks, long-term benefits, or social welfare gains. It is also the case that the broad range
158 of benefits do not accrue to the entity undertaking the costs for the adaptation actions. As a result,
159 private actors lack sufficient financial incentives to invest at socially optimal levels (Cimato and
160 Mullan, 2010). In addition, perverse incentives encourage actions that increase the impacts of climate
161 change reflecting issues of moral hazard. For example, settlements may be (re)built in areas where
162 there is a high risk of flooding by investors (exposure units) who expect to receive compensation
163 from a public agency (as operator) in the case of a disaster (Eisenack and Stecker, 2011).

164

165 **2.2 Financial / Bankability Barriers**

166 Many adaptation measures do not create direct revenue streams (either positive revenues or cost
167 savings), and their magnitude is highly uncertain. This has a dual negative effect on finance
168 adaptation. In reactive projects benefits require time to materialize and generate revenue streams,
169 whereas, investments designed to prevent costs in the future (anticipatory adaptation) are hard to fund
170 publicly, due to uncertainty, discounting and coordination required in public projects or privately
171 (Watkiss & Frontier Economics, 2022). More specifically, uncertainty about future climate-related
172 outcomes, acts as a challenging financial adaptation barrier because it prevents decision makers from
173 agreeing on a common valuation of future costs and on a shared discount rate (Koundouri et al.,
174 2024).

175 These challenges converge in the issue of bankability, that is, the extent to which a project can attract
176 investment by meeting a set of criteria defined by the party providing the financing. A bankable

177 adaptation project is credible, technically feasible, and capable of generating predictable cash flows
178 or measurable impacts that meet investor criteria, extending beyond pure profitability to include
179 resilience gains and alignment with climate goals (Ellis and Pillay, 2017 ;Watkiss & Frontier
180 Economics, 2022). However, adaptation projects frequently fall short of these standards. Low
181 bankability stems from several structural characteristics of adaptation. Projects are often highly site-
182 and context-specific, making them difficult to standardize or replicate. Their benefits can be complex
183 to quantify, particularly when they involve avoided losses rather than direct revenues.
184 Bankability is further constrained by limited technical and financial expertise among both project
185 developers and potential financiers. Adaptation markets and funding streams remain relatively
186 nascent, with insufficient market depth and institutional capacity to support large-scale investment.
187 The lack of precedent also contributes to the perception of adaptation projects as experimental or
188 high-risk. Given that adaptation is inherently cross-cutting spanning sectors, governance levels, and
189 institutions coordination failures are particularly common, further undermining project viability and
190 investment readiness (Watkiss & Frontier Economics, 2022).

191

192 **2.2.1 Low or no revenues from adaptation**

193 Many adaptation projects often do not generate sufficient cash flows to justify capital investments
194 (UNEP FI, 2019). For institutional investors, adaptation projects that cannot clearly guarantee a
195 commercial return are not appealing, creating financial gaps that act as major barriers to adaptation
196 investment (IGCC, 2017). Revenues from climate-risk reduction are currently difficult to identify and
197 capture. Because the benefits of adaptation are often “avoided costs” or risk-reduction rather than
198 direct sales, value-capture mechanisms are challenging to apply, and the dispersed nature of the
199 benefits makes them hard to monetize. The lack of a clear, scalable business model, including
200 predictable revenue streams, is also identified as a core barrier to private investment in adaptation,
201 reinforcing the need for new systemic financing frameworks (Mortimer et al., 2020).

202

203 **2.2.2 High upfront costs**

204 Adaptation projects often require substantial upfront investments while benefits accrue only over the
205 long term, making them hard to justify and unattractive to investors seeking short-term returns
206 (Adaptation Fund, 2022). Adaptation infrastructure in particular demands large initial capital
207 expenditures (CapEx) for resilient assets like flood barriers or irrigation, but returns are delayed,
208 uncertain, and often non-monetary (e.g., avoided losses), unlike mitigation's clearer revenue streams.
209 This creates high perceived risks and long payback periods, making projects unattractive without
210 subsidies or de-risking, thus stalling replication and economies of scale. (Dougherty-Choux et al.,
211 2015). Because these costs must be incurred before any climate-risk reduction benefits materialise,
212 they create cash-flow constraints and risk–return concerns that limit both private-sector participation
213 and public-sector willingness to fund projects (Micale et al., 2018). Standard economic appraisal uses
214 discount rates that diminish the present value of future benefits (see 2.2.3), making the large upfront
215 investment appear financially unattractive at the present.

216

217 **2.2.3 Timing of benefits**

218 The timing of clear, immediate monetary benefits constitutes a major barrier to adaptation finance,
219 since most adaptation measures require substantial upfront investment (as discussed in 2.2.2), while
220 their benefits (primarily avoided damages) may not materialize for decades (e.g. climate-proof
221 infrastructure). Consequently, proactive measures may appear excessive within short appraisal
222 horizons, even if they are efficient over an 80–100-year timeframe (Haasnoot et al., 2020). This
223 temporal mismatch, combined with uncertainty about future climate pathways, creates disincentives
224 for investors and discourages early action and biases decisions toward short-term, inflexible solutions
225 that risk future lock-in or costly retrofits. Even when societal returns are strong, a focus on immediate
226 cash flows and discounted financial returns can undervalue long-term benefits. As a result, projects
227 that are economically justified may appear financially unattractive, leading to underinvestment, while
228 uncertainty about future climate impacts may also raise concerns about overinvestment. This

229 divergence discourages both public and private actors from committing sufficient resources to
230 adaptation.

231

232 **2.3 Information, Knowledge and Awareness Barriers**

233 Information and knowledge gaps regarding the urgency of adaptation effectiveness and the full range
234 of benefits from adaptation actions impede the scaling of financial flows for adaptation and reflect a
235 sizeable market failure, as well as reduce the ability of sub-national and local actors to navigate
236 complex funding systems (Venner et al., 2024).

237

238 **2.3.1 Imperfect information on risks**

239 Among regional authorities and stakeholders there is low perceived urgency of adaptation leading to
240 inaction and exacerbating climate risks. Due to lack of information, actors, e.g. investors, farmers, or
241 businesses, are unaware of the risks and impacts that climate change exacerbates, as well as the
242 measures available to mitigate these risks (Fayolle et al. 2019). Unavailability, inaccessibility, or
243 uneven distribution of information among relevant actors disempowers them from making adaptation
244 decisions and investing accordingly, in particular in developing economies (Stoll et al., 2021).

245 Studies from the UK show that exposure to floods does not automatically raise concern, indicating
246 that direct climate events are not a reliable predictor of adaptive attitudes (Wolf & Moser, 2011).
247 Moreover, in many cases increased insurance coverage may lead policyholders to make fewer
248 preparedness efforts, thereby increasing the risks they face (Hudson & Thieken, 2022).

249

250 There is also a lack (or poor evaluation) of information on the economic implications of climate
251 hazards in terms of economic activity and employment. Weather- and climate-related extremes
252 caused economic losses of assets estimated at EUR 738 billion during 1980–2023 in the European
253 Union, with over EUR 162 billion (22%) occurring between 2021 and 2023 (EEA, 2024). These

254 immediate and long-run damages can be prevented in the future through disaster risk reduction
255 measures and adaptation actions.

256

257 **2.3.2 Information gaps on adaptation benefits and effectiveness**

258 Missing or poorly documented evidence on the effectiveness of adaptation actions, the needs they
259 address, and the benefits they deliver hampers the flow of finance. Economic appraisal of adaptation
260 projects supports this process by demonstrating that a project delivers significant societal benefits and
261 is affordable for public funders, while also showing private funders that it can generate appropriate
262 financial returns and capture value. The process can often be quite technical, particularly when it
263 involves assessing economic benefits that are externalities or non-market in nature. In such cases, the
264 monetization process can be complex, as it requires placing a value on elements that are not directly
265 traded in markets, such as the valuation of ecosystem services. Furthermore, it is challenging to
266 establish a counterfactual—quantifying what the losses would have been without the intervention
267 (OECD, 2025)

268 Insufficient climate-risk data and evidence gaps create uncertainty around future adaptation benefits,
269 making it difficult to build investment-ready business cases. While cost-benefit analyses of adaptation
270 measures are feasible (Stoll et al., 2021), a persistent mismatch remains between the recognised
271 urgency to adapt and the actual flow of investment to adaptation projects (Mortimer, 2020). This
272 disconnect hampers the ability of cities and regions to identify and effectively access available
273 funding mechanisms. Finally, without data on precise impacts of adaptation actions, it is very difficult
274 to leverage innovative financial instruments like green bonds or performance-based grants, thus
275 limiting financial options for many adaptation projects (Watkiss & Frontier Economics, 2022).

276

277 **2.3.3. Lack of information on financial opportunities for adaptation**

278 Funding and financing opportunities are often siloed and scattered, making the identification of
279 financial solutions largely a matter of chance, particularly for smaller or lower-capacity jurisdictions

280 (Moser et al., 2019) Anjanappa et al. (2024) emphasise that limited awareness and fragmented
281 financing mechanisms create mismatches between available instruments and actual local needs. The
282 proliferation of tools, such as green or climate bonds, resilience bonds, and insurance schemes often
283 requires regions to choose among options without first clarifying their underlying financial
284 challenges. Large projects may overshadow grassroots initiatives, rigid funding models limit local
285 adaptability, and funders' aversion to innovative instruments further constrains experimentation.
286 Collectively, this fragmentation contributes to a convoluted financing landscape that hampers
287 effective climate-adaptation investment.

288

289 A recent survey from the Adaptation Mission (European Commission, 2023) highlights that national
290 and regional grants dominate the landscape of financing options for adaptation. Cohesion Policy
291 funds also proliferate as they are well known, readily accessible to regional authorities, and closely
292 aligned with existing public budgetary structures in many signatory regions. Among EU programmes,
293 HEU and LIFE generate considerable interest for future engagement, although its current uptake
294 remains comparatively limited. In contrast, financing from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and
295 from private or commercial banks remains limited, indicating very low levels of familiarity and
296 experience with these more complex financing mechanisms. This dominant use of public financing
297 means that authorities have less incentive to explore market-based instruments, especially when
298 dedicated adaptation budgets and teams are already aligned with EU-level programmes. Finally, the
299 limited track record of bank-funded adaptation projects reduces peer learning opportunities,
300 reinforcing the perception that such sources are either unsuitable or too complex for regional
301 climate-adaptation needs.

302

303 **2.4 Governance, Regulatory and Institutional Barriers**

304 **2.4.1 Regulatory Complexity and Red Tape**

305 Bureaucratic barriers, including complex application and approval processes, significantly hinder
306 access to climate finance, delaying project implementation (Anjanappa et al., 2024). Governance
307 barriers (also called institutional barriers) are identified by several sources (Frontier et al., 2013;
308 HMG, 2013). These can constrain action, creating challenges or slow planning and implementation.
309 The public sector also faces multiple challenges that hinder the translation of planning into effective
310 action. Risk assessments often fail to directly inform adaptation measures, remaining largely as
311 paperwork without triggering concrete implementation. The inherent complexity and high uncertainty
312 of adaptation require diverse tools, frameworks, and interdisciplinary knowledge, which can
313 overwhelm public bodies (Yule et al., 2023).

314

315 Furthermore, lack of transparency and corruption significantly undermine the effectiveness and
316 equity of climate finance by diverting resources from vulnerable populations and urgent needs, and
317 allowing politically connected entities to capture funds. Weak governance systems, coupled with
318 insufficient monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, create accountability gaps that make it difficult
319 to track fund use, contributing to inequitable distribution and eroding trust among stakeholders.
320 Marginalized groups and smaller local entities are particularly affected, often being excluded from
321 benefits, which further entrenches social and economic inequalities (Anjanappa et al., 2024).

322

323 Regulatory barriers can also generate *multiplicative complexity*, when overlapping or poorly aligned
324 regulations interact, creating friction and increasing compliance burdens for project developers
325 (Watkiss & Frontier Economics, 2022). Incoherence between environmental regulation, public
326 funding mechanisms, and incentive structures further elevates transaction costs. This lack of
327 regulatory alignment makes it particularly difficult to finance innovative and nature-based adaptation
328 projects, as unresolved regulatory and eligibility issues increase the likelihood of delays and financial
329 losses (FUKR, 2022).

330

331 **2.4.2 Lack of multilevel governance cooperation**

332 Regional authorities face significant challenges in coordinating across governance levels when
333 attracting and leveraging financial resources for adaptation actions. This creates an added layer of
334 regulatory complexity and limits the capacity of regions or municipalities to act quickly while
335 leveraging local knowledge. Unclear governance structures can reduce investor confidence, and
336 limited public sector capacity at regional or local levels can hinder the development and delivery of
337 business plans. Fragmented regulatory frameworks at EU, national, regional, and local levels create
338 inconsistencies that undermine effective adaptation strategies. For instance, EU regions may develop
339 strong adaptation strategies that are weakened by discrepancies in national regulations and their
340 implementation. Policy incoherence, where sectoral policies work at cross-purposes, further disrupts
341 coordination and prevents efficient resource allocation.

342

343 Frontier et al. (2013) and HMG (2013) also identify the potential for co-ordination failures where
344 sectors are fragmented and many parties are involved in adaptation actions. It is noted that adaptation
345 frequently involves cross-cutting themes, and thus multiple actors and institutions with different
346 objectives, jurisdictional authority and levels of power and resources, making it more difficult to align
347 governance and get agreement (Watkiss et al., 2015). Highly detailed and restrictive eligibility
348 criteria, narrow legal definitions, and variations in procedural frameworks across funding instruments
349 impose substantial administrative burdens, reducing the capacity of local authorities to identify,
350 access, and manage appropriate finance (Moser et al., 2019; Doshi & Garschagen, 2020).

351 **2.4.3 Lack of skills and technical capacity**

352 Low technical and institutional capacity among regional stakeholders and financiers is a core barrier
353 to scaling up adaptation and resilience finance. Understanding climate risks at a level suitable for
354 financial decision-making requires expertise often lacking in financial regulatory agencies and
355 institutions, due to the novelty and complexity of climate issues, which span science, economics,

356 management, and policy. This capacity gap hinders regulators and financial institutions from
357 integrating climate considerations into risk assessment and policymaking (UNEP, 2019).

358 The public sector faces difficulties in integrating scenario-based evidence into traditional decision-
359 making frameworks that prioritize credibility, legitimacy, and salience, often resulting in limited
360 influence on actual policy actions (Rickards et al., 2014), as well as providing evidence that need to
361 be addressed to make a stronger case for investment.

362

363 According to an OECD survey (2021) the most frequently cited barriers to expanding
364 green-budgeting-related adaptation finance are lack of methodologies, resources and skilled capacity.

365 More specifically, the two biggest impediments for adaptation implementation, reflecting both
366 technical gaps (e.g., tools for assessing environmental effects) and the financial and human capacity
367 needed to apply them. A shortage of technical expertise and staff time is also highlighted, with many
368 countries reporting that they do not have enough trained personnel to develop and operate
369 green-budgeting tools.

370

371 **2.5 Behavioural, Social and Cultural Barriers**

372 Psychological, cultural, social norms and organizational factors that shape perceptions, decision-
373 making, and actions among stakeholders also impose barriers for adaptation finance. Unlike
374 economic or technical barriers, behavioral challenges are deeply rooted in human cognition and social
375 dynamics, making them complex and context specific (England et al., 2026). Even when individuals
376 are motivated, the combination of social, institutional or other obstacles, such as insufficient policy
377 support, limit the ability to translate pro-environmental intentions into adaptive actions, leading to
378 entrenched behaviours, which eventually act as behavioural barriers to adaptation.

379

380 **2.5.1 Perceived urgency of adaptation**

381 Individual behavior can impede climate adaptation, as decision-makers may be reluctant to implement
382 measures that involve changes to existing practices, investments, or governance structures, often due
383 to a preference for preserving the status quo on top of a miscalculation of risks due to lack of
384 consistent data, as outlined in 2.3.1. In the presence of uncertainty, people's behavior is more likely
385 driven by perceived rather than actual risk. Risk perception can be influenced by factors such as
386 memory and emotions, which may cause individuals to overestimate the likelihood of low-probability
387 events.

388

389 Also, evidence suggests that behaviour patterns often include inaction, procrastination, which may
390 lead to high costs in the long run, and are inconsistent with classic economic models of utility
391 maximisation. Instead, there is a tendency for people to demonstrate inertia, procrastinate and have
392 implicitly high discount rates, i.e. to place very little weight on the future consequences of their
393 decisions, which can be detrimental for adaptation (Cimato and Mullan, 2010).

394

395 **2.5.2 Social and Cultural lock-ins**

396 Social dynamics, including trust deficits between communities and governing bodies, can further
397 complicate collective action on adaptation initiatives (Koundouri et al., 2023), while factors such as
398 the diversity of values, perceptions of risk, cultural attachments, and social structures can constrain
399 adaptation efforts. Societal and cultural priorities may hinder or facilitate adaptation depending on
400 how they influence decision-making and societal goals. Moreover, financing public-goods projects is
401 entangled with social-dilemma dynamics; collective funding requires cooperation, yet individuals
402 often prioritize personal pay-offs over the shared benefit, undermining the pool of resources needed
403 for adaptation (Koundouri et al., 2023).

404 In some regions, cultural attitudes towards risk and nature may conflict with scientific approaches to
405 adaptation. For example, traditional reliance on reactive measures rather than proactive planning can
406 delay the implementation of effective adaptation strategies (England et al., 2026). A lack of focused

407 climate education, strong cultural-worldview filters and limited direct immersion in natural
408 environments impede the acquisition of the knowledge and skills needed for effective adaptation
409 (Wolf & Moser, 2011). Also, the cultural and symbolic attachment to physical places, which are often
410 undervalued in decision-making processes can have devastating cultural and social repercussions for
411 communities strongly anchored to those locations. The current metrics tend to undervalue these
412 cultural and symbolic losses, thus acting as a social barrier because they do not sufficiently influence
413 adaptation decisions (Adger et al., 2009).

414

415 **2.5.3 Low willingness to pay for adaptation**

416 Households and businesses play a crucial role in financing efforts to reduce climate risks and capture
417 potential savings from climate action. However, many stakeholders, particularly households, are
418 accustomed to these costs being covered by governments. This expectation can lead to a lower
419 willingness to pay directly for adaptation or mitigation measures, potentially limiting the level of
420 private investment. To better understand public support for such investments, researchers have
421 applied valuation methods to assess attitudes. Study has shown that the lowest willingness-to-pay
422 (WTP) for urban-adaptation measures is recorded for traffic-noise with a mean WTP (MWTP) of
423 only €42 across the 80 valuation studies (Halkos et al., 2024). These approaches help quantify the
424 extent to which individuals are prepared to contribute financially to climate-related initiatives. In
425 some cases, there may be a willingness to pay through tax revenues (i.e households and businesses
426 are happy for the government to invest in adaptation using tax revenues), but the incentives are not
427 strong enough for them to want to invest directly (Watkiss & Frontier Economics, 2022).

428 **3. The P2R Adaptation Investment Cycle and barriers to adaptation finance**

429 **3.1 Adaptation Investment Planning and the AIC**

430 In order to encourage flows of adaptation finance, *Adaptation Investment Plans (AIPs)* have emerged
431 as outcomes of processes which connect high level visions of countries and translate them into
432 discrete projects and programmes for financing (Asian Development Bank, 2023; Hernández &

433 Ceinos, 2025; IISD, 2022). AIPs can act as the missing link for bridging the adaptation finance gap
434 in European regions as they enhance regional capacity by bundling adaptation objectives into
435 investment packages and sequence adaptation actions based on both urgency and economic
436 feasibility. According to the UNFCCC (2022, p. 15) “regional planning for adaptation allows project
437 developers to mobilize limited resources that would have otherwise been difficult to mobilize, which
438 in turn stimulates confidence among actors and further creates the sense of shared responsibility and
439 solidarity”.


440

441 In this context, *Pathways2Resilience (P2R)* Horizon EU project is seeking to increase the resilience
442 of at least 100 (+50) European regions and communities through transformative visions and
443 adaptation pathways. It applies a region-wide, place-based approach and offers a rich capacity-
444 building portfolio that includes training sessions, online materials, and detailed guidance documents,
445 while mainstreaming regions’ financial and economic considerations into the Regional Resilience
446 Journey (RRJ) and working to address the adaptation finance gap through a tailored process known
447 as the Adaptation Investment Cycle (AIC) (see Figure 2), ultimately delivering a Climate Resilience
448 Investment Plan aligned with the Climate Resilience Strategy and Action Plan (Koundouri et al.,
449 2023).

450 The AIC acts as the P2R adaptation investment framework and is a flexible step-by-step financial
451 planning framework consisting of six phases and eighteen tasks in total (see Figure 3). This approach
452 translates regions’ high-level visions into pipelines of bankable projects, focuses on addressing
453 systemic barriers to adaptation finance, places strong emphasis on the financial and economic
454 rationale from the very first step, and departs from the traditionally science-driven adaptation cycle
455 in which economics and finance are often deferred until step four, when options are assessed. The
456 AIC works in parallel with the RRJ and the formation of the action plan, ensuring that regional climate
457 adaptation actions and the choice of adaptation pathways are not only well-designed, but also reflects
458 economic and financial viability, on top of urgency for cities and regions (England et al., 2026).

459

460 **Figure 2. The Pathways2Resilience Adaptation Investment Cycle.**



461

462 Source: *England et al., 2026.*

463 The AIC tasks provide a blueprint in principle, while encouraging regions to have different entry
 464 points, acknowledging existing regional financial planning and offering touchpoints for adaptation
 465 investment. It also considers local contexts, barriers, and challenges in shaping pathways and
 466 expanding the portfolio of financing solutions, while ensuring that all population groups are
 467 considered and accounting for both future costs and the costs of inaction from the onset.

468 Each AIC task provides step-by-step guidance on its significance for the Investment Plan and
 469 adaptation financing, highlighting the elements to prioritize. Each task also includes guidance
 470 materials and examples from other regions to inspire learning and support effective implementation,
 471 helping to overcome barriers and develop a bankable, viable Investment Plan. AIC serves as a tool
 472 for regional resilience by combining flexibility, integration, adaptability, and justice and equity.

473

474 **3.2 Mapping AIC Tasks to adaptation finance Barriers**

475 The AIC stands at the intersection of the elevated need for adaptation action and the proliferation of
476 the mentioned barriers to adaptation finance. Through its distinct phases and tasks it equips regional
477 authorities with the capacity to address most of the aforementioned barriers. Having said that, the
478 development of a succinct adaptation (or resilience) investment plan as a direct outcome from the
479 AIC constitutes a key catalyst for scaling financial resources as it structures, prioritizes and sequences
480 regional adaptation actions and integrates assessments on their financial viability alongside the
481 adaptation strategy. More specifically, AIC addresses Economic/Market barriers by identifying both
482 the economic and social benefits of adaptation while encouraging the development of a strong
483 economic rationale. For Financial/Bankability barriers, it promotes the diversification of funding
484 sources and ensures that bankability considerations are prioritized from the outset.

485 Regarding Information, Knowledge and Awareness barriers, it guides regional planners to directly
486 address systemic financial barriers, ensuring informed and effective decision-making. When it comes
487 to Governance, Regulatory and Institutional barriers, it streamlines processes to acknowledge
488 regional priorities and governance structures, as well as it is embedded in innovation agendas and
489 introduces financial innovations to support adaptation efforts. Finally, to overcome Behavioural,
490 Social and Cultural barriers it co-creates value propositions with all relevant stakeholders, fostering
491 collaboration and shared understanding.

492 To dive deeper, this study specifically shows which barriers to adaptation finance each of the 18 AIC
493 Tasks can address, in order to support regions in developing their Climate Investment Plan (Table 1).

494

495 **Table 1. Stages, descriptions, and tasks of the P2R Adaptation Investment Cycle, along with the**
496 **associated finance barriers it addresses.**

Tasks	Types of barriers addressed
1.1 Identify policy and financing context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Fiscal limitations ● Lack of information on financial opportunities for adaptation ● Regulatory complexity and red tape ● Lack of multilevel governance cooperation
1.2 Gather baseline economic and financial evidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Imperfect information on risks ● Perceived urgency of adaptation ● Information gaps on adaptation benefits and effectiveness
1.3 Develop adaptation objectives and economic rationale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Public good characteristics / Positive externalities ● Imperfect information on risks ● Lack of multilevel governance cooperation
2.1 Identify current and desired sources and instruments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Low or no revenues from adaptation ● High upfront costs ● Lack of information on financial opportunities for adaptation
2.2 Identify finance barriers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>cross-cutting</i>
2.3 Improve access to finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Fiscal limitations ● Lack of information on financial opportunities for adaptation ● Regulatory complexity and red tape ● Low willingness to pay for adaptation

3.1 Longlist adaptation options and assess benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Timing of benefits ● Information gaps on adaptation benefits and effectiveness ● Social and cultural lock-ins
3.2 Prioritise and sequence adaptation options into pathways	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Imperfect information on risks ● Perceived urgency of adaptation
3.3 Turn pathways into investment packages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● High upfront costs ● Low or no revenues from adaptation
4.1 Identify economic, fiscal and financial benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Low or no revenues from adaptation ● Information gaps on adaptation benefits and effectiveness ● Low willingness to pay for adaptation
4.2 Assess economic and financial returns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Low or no revenues from adaptation ● Timing of benefits ● Information gaps on adaptation benefits and effectiveness
4.3 Matchmaking actions with funding and financing opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Misaligned incentives ● Low or no revenues from adaptation ● Lack of information on financial opportunities
5.1 Develop a business model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Misaligned incentives ● Low or no revenues from adaptation ● Low willingness to pay for adaptation
5.2 Undertake financial structuring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Low or no revenues from adaptation

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● High upfront costs ● Timing of benefits
5.3 Develop a commercial structure and delivery plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Regulatory complexity and red tape ● Lack of multilevel governance cooperation
6.1 Identify, monitor and disclose progress on adaptation financing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Regulatory complexity and red tape ● Lack of multilevel governance cooperation ● Lack of technical and skills capacity
6.2 Report on externally financed projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Regulatory complexity and red tape ● Lack of multilevel governance cooperation
6.3 Learn and reflect on the preparation of your Investment Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Regulatory complexity and red tape ● Lack of multilevel governance cooperation ● Lack of technical and skills capacity

497

498

499

500

501

502 **4. A deep dive into pressing adaptation finance barriers**

503 **4.1 Low or no revenues from climate risk reduction**

504 The lack or uncertainty of revenues from adaptation actions present one of the core financing barriers
505 explicitly recognised in the AIC. It constitutes a serious challenge for attracting private financing and
506 creates a wedge between economic and financial benefits. Rather than attempting to force revenues
507 where they don't naturally exist, the AIC offers a more sophisticated approach: it reframes value,
508 reallocates who pays, and restructures projects so that investment becomes viable despite weak direct

509 cash flows. The AIC addresses this mainly during Phase 4 - Economic appraisal and finance
510 matchmaking, where regional authorities identify the full set of benefits, co-benefits and beneficiaries
511 from the final list of adaptation options in their pathways.

512 Specifically, Tasks 4.1 and 4.2 concentrate on identifying benefits and assessing economic and
513 financial returns. These tasks critically separate economic value from financial revenue by
514 quantifying avoided damages, service continuity, health gains, and ecosystem services. This
515 demonstrates that projects can deliver high economic returns even when financial returns are weak or
516 nonexistent. The process distinguishes who benefits, who pays, and who finances upfront, allowing
517 projects with no revenues to remain investment-worthy in public finance terms. This reframing
518 supports justification for tax-based funding, transfers, and EU grants while enabling blended
519 structures where public funds cover the non-revenue components and providing evidence to indirectly
520 crowd in finance from insurers, utilities, and land-use actors. Essentially, the AIC replaces "no
521 revenues" with "strong socio-economic returns" as the primary decision criterion. Finally, in Task 4.3
522 the list of adaptation options is enhanced with a description of potential value capture mechanisms,
523 essentially targeting the issue of revenue generation where possible. Having identified the
524 beneficiaries in a holistic manner, allows practitioners to consider who can ultimately pay for
525 adaptation.

526 Task 3.3 transforms pathways into investment packages by bundling measures rather than financing
527 single adaptation actions in isolation. These packages combine non-revenue adaptation components
528 like flood protection and early warning systems with revenue-neutral or revenue-positive elements
529 such as climate-proofed infrastructure, nature-based tourism, and energy efficiency improvements.
530 This packaging enables cross-subsidisation and improves overall bankability, reducing reliance on
531 each project generating its own income while enabling hybrid funding models that combine grants,
532 loans, and budgets. Together, these AIC tasks allow regions to finance adaptation without pretending
533 it behaves like a commercial investment.

534

535 4.2 Regulatory Complexity and Red Tape

536 Lengthy regulatory procedures, complex permitting requirements, and fragmented administrative
537 responsibilities are a major barrier to delivering adaptation at regional level. Adaptation projects often
538 cut across sectors such as water, land use, infrastructure, and nature, triggering multiple approval
539 processes that are poorly aligned in time and scope. These delays increase transaction costs, deter
540 private actors, and undermine the credibility of adaptation investment pipelines. The AIC addresses
541 this barrier by embedding regulatory awareness, reform actions, and learning into the investment
542 planning process.

543 Task 1.1 tackles regulatory barriers upstream, before projects are fully defined. Regions are guided
544 to systematically map the policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks that shape adaptation action,
545 including planning law, environmental permitting, and procurement rules, as well as the budgetary
546 and approval processes that influence the timing and sequencing of investments. Regions also
547 examine the alignment or misalignment between adaptation objectives and sectoral regulations. By
548 making regulatory constraints explicit at an early stage, Task 1.1 helps regions avoid designing
549 adaptation pathways that are institutionally unrealistic and enables early identification of bottlenecks
550 that may affect costs, timelines, or feasibility. These can then be factored into prioritisation and
551 sequencing decisions rather than emerging as late-stage obstacles. The task also stresses the
552 importance of understanding financial approval processes and decision-making around budget and
553 capital investments from the outset, ensuring that the Climate Resilience Strategy and eventual
554 Investment Plan are aligned with wider regional priorities and comply with existing governance
555 requirements.

556 Task 2.3 directly addresses red tape by reframing regulatory complexity as an enabling environment
557 challenge rather than a fixed constraint. Regions are encouraged to streamline or coordinate approval
558 processes across departments and levels of government, clarify regulatory responsibilities, and
559 introduce standardised procedures or guidance for adaptation-related investments. Crucially, the task

560 allows regions to treat regulatory reform itself as a strategic adaptation action, potentially supported
561 by technical assistance or public funding. By linking regulatory improvements to financing outcomes,
562 the AIC strengthens the incentive for institutional change and reduces the transaction costs that often
563 stall adaptation projects. The task also acknowledges that institutional change is a lengthy process,
564 and so directs focus towards financial solutions that can progress under the current or slightly
565 improved institutional landscape.

566 Finally, Task 6.3 ensures that regulatory barriers are not only addressed once but progressively
567 reduced over time. Through structured learning and reflection, regions assess the extent to which
568 regulatory bottlenecks impeded the adaptation investment plan, which procedures caused delays or
569 increased costs, whether early assumptions about permitting and approvals proved accurate, and how
570 governance arrangements can be improved in future iterations of the Investment Plan.

571

572 **4.3 Lack of information on financial opportunities for adaptation**

573 Many regions remain locked into a narrow set of traditional financial sources and instruments,
574 typically public budgets and grants, due to lack of information on this issue. While essential, these
575 instruments are insufficient to meet growing adaptation needs and often reinforce short-term, siloed
576 investment decisions. This lock-in limits innovation, constrains scale, and reduces the ability to crowd
577 in private or blended finance. The AIC explicitly targets this barrier by expanding the strategic
578 financing horizon of regions and embedding diversification into investment planning.

579 Task 2.1 is the primary mechanism for breaking conceptual and institutional lock-in. Regions are
580 guided to map existing sources and instruments currently used for adaptation and related investments,
581 an exercise that can raise awareness of potential lock-in to traditional finance. From there, they
582 identify additional or underutilised sources, such as development banks, utilities, private capital, and
583 insurers, alongside alternative instruments like loans, guarantees, blended finance, and revolving
584 funds. Regions also assess the suitability of different instruments for different types of adaptation

585 actions, whether climate-proofing or pure adaptation. By distinguishing between what is used today
586 and what could be used in the future, Task 2.1 creates a structured space for regions to challenge
587 inherited financing practices, shifting adaptation from a grant-funded public responsibility towards a
588 portfolio of investments aligned with risk, benefits, and beneficiaries. This task is supported by the
589 P2R Catalogue of Sources and Instruments (England et al., 2024), which includes 57 sources, 78
590 instruments, and 169 case studies demonstrating how regions can move beyond traditional public
591 financing and EC grants.

592 Task 2.3 then operationalises diversification by addressing the barriers that prevent regions from
593 accessing new sources and instruments, including lack of familiarity, institutional risk aversion,
594 regulatory constraints, and limited technical capacity. Regions identify concrete actions to unlock
595 alternative financing, such as capacity building or aggregation of projects, and sequence these so that
596 more complex instruments are introduced progressively. This task recognises that financial lock-in is
597 not only technical but institutional, and explicitly links institutional change to improved access to
598 finance. Its results feed back into Task 2.1, allowing teams to recalibrate their list of desired sources
599 and instruments over time.

600 Finally, Task 4.3 translates diversification ambitions into practical financing decisions. Regions
601 match specific adaptation actions with the most appropriate mix of sources and instruments based on
602 cost, risk profile, and benefits, combining public funding with other instruments to de-risk and
603 leverage additional capital. Through this matchmaking process, Task 4.3 normalises the use of non-
604 traditional instruments and builds confidence among regional authorities to move beyond established
605 funding pathways.

606

607 **5. Conclusion**

608 Bridging the adaptation finance gap requires addressing a broad set of barriers. Climate-related
609 projects demand long-term financing, yet financial markets favor short-term investments, while

610 public funding alone cannot meet the growing need for climate resilience. Institutional investors such
611 as insurers can provide long-term capital; however, allocation inefficiencies, limited risk-transfer
612 mechanisms, and complex procedures constrain private investment. Governance is equally critical:
613 strong institutions, transparency, and technical capacity enable equitable finance distribution, while
614 weak governance and information asymmetries restrict access. Simplified procedures and increased
615 transparency are therefore essential to unlock resources, particularly for vulnerable regions.

616 This study identifies the most frequently encountered adaptation finance barriers affecting adaptation
617 planning and implementation and classifies them into five broad categories, based on established
618 literature, providing a structured basis for analysis. Each category is then described in greater depth
619 by disaggregating it into specific sub-barriers, enabling a more nuanced understanding of the
620 challenges involved.

621 Against this background, the AIC offers a structured, region-wide framework consisting of 18 tasks
622 to identify which of these AIC tasks address each of these barriers. By integrating strategic planning,
623 economic and financial appraisal and investment prioritization, the AIC strengthens the capacity to
624 develop coherent and bankable Climate Resilience Investment Plans. In doing so, it responds to
625 governance constraints, information gaps, economic justification challenges, and financial structuring
626 needs. Closing adaptation finance gaps therefore requires not only additional resources, but also
627 structured processes that reflect regional differences in capacity and vulnerability.

628 The analysis of key barriers further illustrates how the AIC provides targeted solutions. For projects
629 with low or no direct revenues, the AIC distinguishes economic value from financial returns,
630 identifies beneficiaries, and enables blended finance arrangements that combine public and
631 complementary instruments. To address regulatory complexity, it incorporates early mapping of legal
632 and institutional frameworks, supports alignment of procedures, and promotes continuous learning to
633 reduce administrative obstacles. To overcome limited awareness of financing options, it encourages

634 diversification beyond traditional sources by identifying alternative instruments and matching them
635 to specific adaptation actions, thereby expanding financial capacity and reducing lock-in.

636 Adaptation finance is not a one-size-fits-all process. Differences in socioeconomic conditions,
637 institutional capacity, governance quality, and climate risk exposure can intensify financial barriers
638 and widen investment gaps within each region's Climate Investment Plan. By sequencing and
639 applying the AIC tasks, regions can address these disparities in a systematic manner, even if the AIC
640 alone may not be sufficient to fully overcome all barriers to adaptation (England, 2026). Ultimately,
641 this process supports more equitable access to finance and contributes to territorial cohesion within
642 the European context.

643

644

645

646

647

648

649

650 **References**

651 Adaptation Fund. (2022). *Scaling up adaptation finance*.

652 Adger, W. N., Dessai, S., Goulden, M., Hulme, M., Lorenzoni, I., Nelson, D. R., ... & Wreford, A.
653 (2009). Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change?. *Climatic Change*, 93(3),
654 335–354.

- 655 Allan, S., Bahadur, A. V., Venkatramani, S., & Soundarajan, V. (2019). *The role of domestic*
656 *budgets in financing climate change adaptation: A background paper for the Global*
657 *Commission on Adaptation*. Global Center on Adaptation & Oxford Policy Management.
- 658 Anjanappa, J., Samant, S., & Thakur, B. (2024). Bridging the gap: addressing the unequal allocation
659 of climate adaptation finance in the global South. Available at SSRN 4985851.
- 660 Asian Development Bank. (2023). *Climate Adaptation Investment Planning process* (described in
661 OECD Green Finance & Investment report).
- 662 Baer, P. (2006). Adaptation: who pays whom. *Fairness in adaptation to climate change*, 131–153.
- 663 Banhalmi-Zakar, Z., Ware, D., Edwards, I., Kelly, K., Becken, S., & Cox, R. (2016). *Mechanisms*
664 *to finance climate change adaptation in Australia*. National Climate Change Adaptation
665 Research Facility, Gold Coast, Australia.
- 666 Bisaro, A., & Hinkel, J. (2018). Mobilizing private finance for coastal adaptation: A literature
667 review. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 9(3), e514.
- 668 Buchner, B., Naran, B., Padmanabhi, R., Stout, S., Strinati, C., Wignarajah, D., Miao, G., Connolly,
669 J., & Marini, N. (2023). *Global landscape of climate finance 2023*. Climate Policy
670 Initiative.
- 671 Cimato, F., & Mullan, M. (2010). *Adapting to Climate Change: Analysing the Role of Government*.
672 DEFRA Evidence and Analysis Series Paper 1, Department for Environment, Food and
673 Rural Affairs (DEFRA), London, UK.
- 674 Cools et al. (2024). *Understanding Transformational Adaptation. A shared vision across EU*
675 *Horizon projects*. Policy brief under the Mission Implementation Platform (MIP4Adapt).
- 676 CPI. (2024). *Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2024: Insights for COP 29*.

- 677 Dougherty-Choux, L., Terpstra, P., Kammila, S., & Kurukulasuriya, P. (2015). Adapting from the
678 ground up. Enabling small businesses in developing countries to adapt to climate change.
679 *World Resources Institute and UNDP.*
- 680 Doshi, D., & Garschagen, M. (2020). Understanding adaptation finance allocation: Which factors
681 enable or constrain vulnerable countries to access funding?. *Sustainability*, 12(10), 4308.
- 682 Druce, L., Moslener, U., Gruening, C., Pauw, W. P., & Connell, R. (2016). *Demystifying adaptation*
683 *finance for the private sector.* UNEP FI, Geneva.
- 684 ECONADAPT. (2017). *Review of the Costs and benefits of adaptation.*
- 685 EEA. (2024). *Regional Adaptation Support Tool.*
- 686 England, K. (2024). *Developing evidence for the Pathways2Resilience Climate Resilience*
687 *Investment Plan process – A summary of the economic and financial implications of climate*
688 *change for Lower Austria.* Case study, Pathways2Resilience project.
- 689 England, K., Watkiss, P., Hunt, A., Dellis, K., Barrett, S., Taylor, R., & Whittaker, S. (2026). Using
690 a dedicated adaptation financing process to close subnational adaptation finance gaps in
691 Europe. *Ecological Economics*, 242, 108898.
- 692 England, K., Watkiss, P., Qian, C., & Plataniotis, A. (2024). *D5.2 – Catalogue of sources and*
693 *instruments and adaptation finance process.*
- 694 England K., Dellis, K., Enev, A, Corvaro, M., Qian, C., Eltinay, N., (2026). Developing Regional
695 Climate Resilience Investment Plans and Project Pipelines. Implementation guidance to
696 support regions through the Adaptation Investment Cycle.

- 697 England, K., Watkiss, P., Hunt, A., Dellis, K., Barrett, S., Taylor, R., & Whittaker, S.(2026). Using
698 a dedicated adaptation financing process to close subnational adaptation finance gaps in
699 Europe, *Ecological Economics*, 242, 108898.
- 700 Eisenack, K., & Stecker, R. (2012). A framework for analyzing climate change adaptations as
701 actions. *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change*, 17(3), 243–260.
- 702 Ellis, C. and Pillay, K. (2017). Understanding ‘bankability’ and unlocking climate finance for
703 climate compatible development. London: CDKN
- 704 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. (2026). Debt
705 Sustainability Monitor 2025 (*Institutional Paper 332*). European Commission.
- 706 European Environmental Agency. (2024). *Economic losses from weather- and climate-related*
707 *extremes in Europe*.
- 708 European Commission. (2023). Analysis of information provided by the signatories of the charter of
709 the Mission Adaptation to Climate Change.
- 710 Fayolle, V., Fouvet, C., Soundarajan, V., Nath, V., Acharya, S., Gupta, N., & Petrarulo, L. (2019).
711 *Engaging the private sector in financing adaptation to climate change: learning from*
712 *practice*. Action on Climate Today, Learning Paper.
- 713 Finzi Hart, J. A., Grifman, P. M., Moser, S. C., Abeles, A., Myers, M. R., Schlosser, S. C., &
714 Ekstrom, J. A. (2012). *Rising to the challenge: results of the 2011 coastal California*
715 *adaptation needs assessment*. University of Southern California Sea Grant Program.
- 716 FUKR. (2022). *Financing UK Nature Recovery: scaling up high-integrity environmental markets*
717 *across the UK*.

- 718 Gautam, D., Gratcheva, E., Natalucci, F. M., & Prasad, A. (2024). *Unlocking adaptation finance in*
719 *emerging market and developing economies* (Staff Climate Notes, Vol. 2024, Issue 007).
720 International Monetary Fund.
- 721 Haasnoot, M., van Aalst, M., Rozenberg, J. (2020). Investments under non-stationarity: economic
722 evaluation of adaptation pathways.
- 723 Halkos, G., Aslanidis, P.-S., Landis, C., Papadaki, L., & Koundouri, P. (2024). A review of primary
724 and cascading hazards by exploring individuals' willingness-to-pay for urban sustainability
725 policies. *City and Environment Interactions*, 24, 100178.
- 726 Hernández, M., Ledwell, C., & Yang, G. (2025). *Finance for National Adaptation Plan Processes*.
727 NAP Global Network / IISD.
- 728 HMG. (2013). *The National Adaptation Programme Report: Analytical Annex – Economics of the*
729 *National Adaptation Programme*.
- 730 Hudson, P., & Thieken, A. H. (2022). The presence of moral hazard regarding flood insurance and
731 German private businesses. *Natural Hazards*, 112(2), 1295–1319.
- 732 IGCC. (2017). *From Risk to Return: Investing in Climate Change*. Investor Group on Climate
733 Change.
- 734 Johannes; Pittel, Karen. (2025). To adapt or not to adapt: Costs, benefits, and financing of
735 adaptation in the EU, EconPol Forum, ISSN 2752-1184, CESifo GmbH, Munich, Vol. 26,
736 Iss. 2, pp. 5-12.
- 737 Kállay, L., & Takács, T. (2023). The impact of public subsidies on investment and growth: Policy
738 about evaluation, selection and monitoring. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 45(5), 895-909.

- 739 Khan, M. R., & Munira, S. (2021). Climate change adaptation as a global public good: implications
740 for financing. *Climatic Change*, 167(3), 50.
- 741 Koundouri, P., Dellis, K., Landis, C., Plataniotis, A., & Zisiadou, A. (2023). *Synthesis of barriers
742 and solutions for Adaptation Finance*. Deliverable 5.1, Pathways2Resilience Project.
- 743 Koundouri, P., Hammer, B., Kuhl, U., & Velias, A. (2023). Behavioral Economics and
744 neuroeconomics of environmental values. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 15(1).
- 745 Koundouri, P., Papayiannis, G. I., Petracou, E. V., & Yannacopoulos, A. N. (2024). Consensus
746 Group Decision making under model uncertainty with a view towards environmental policy
747 making. *Environmental and Resource Economics*.
- 748 Micale, V., Tonkonogy, B., & Mazza, F. (2018). *Understanding and Increasing Finance for
749 Climate Adaptation in Developing Countries*. Climate Policy Initiative.
- 750 Monteleone, L., Roberti, G., Fossati, F., Davies, W., Forster, D., Miras Lopez, C., Cimino, S.,
751 Magdoud, L., Illes, A., Trozzo, C., & Galluccio, G. (2026). *Final report: Assessment of EU and
752 Member States adaptation investment needs*. CINEA.
- 753 Mortimer, G., Whelan, B., & Lee, C. (2020). *Adaptation Finance: Emerging approaches to solve
754 the climate adaptation finance gap*. Climate-KIC Australia.
- 755 Moser, S. C., Ekstrom, J. A., Kim, J., & Heitsch, S. (2019). Adaptation finance archetypes. *Ecology
756 & Society*, 24(2).
- 757 Moser, S. C., Finzi Hart, J. A., Newton Mann, A., Sadrpour, N., & Grifman, P. M. (2018b).
758 *Growing effort, growing challenge*. California's Fourth Climate Change Assessment.
- 759 Murphy, D. (2022). *The landscape of financing strategies for adaptation in developing countries*.
760 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

- 761 Nelson, R., Kokic, P., Crimp, S., Meinke, H., & Howden, S. M. (2010). The vulnerability of
762 Australian rural communities. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 13(1), 8–17.
- 763 Nielsen, J. Ø., & Reenberg, A. (2010). Cultural barriers to climate change adaptation. *Global*
764 *Environmental Change*, 20(1), 142–152.
- 765 OECD. (2021). *Green Budgeting in OECD Countries*. OECD Publishing, Paris.
- 766 OECD. (2025). *Scaling Finance and Investment for Climate Adaptation*. OECD Publishing, Paris.
- 767 Richardson, R. B. (2009). Belize and climate change: the costs of inaction. *Human Development*
768 *Issues*, UNDP.
- 769 Rickards, L., Wiseman, J., Edwards, T., & Biggs, C. (2014). The problem of fit: scenario planning
770 and climate change adaptation in the public sector. *Environment and Planning C:*
771 *Government and Policy*, 32(4), 641-662.
- 772 Scott, D., McBoyle, G., & Minogue, A. (2007). Climate change and Quebec's ski industry. *Global*
773 *Environmental Change*, 17(2), 181–190.
- 774 Stoll, P. P., Pauw, W. P., Tohme, F., et al. (2021). Mobilizing private adaptation finance. *Climatic*
775 *Change*, 167, 45.
- 776 Tol, R. S., Bohn, M., Downing, T. E., Guillerminet, M. L., Hizsnyik, E., Kasperson, R. & Yetkiner,
777 I. H. (2006). Adaptation to five metres of sea level rise. *Journal of Risk Research*, 9(5), 467–
778 482.
- 779 UNEP. (2016). *The Adaptation Finance Gap Report 2016*. United Nations Environment Programme,
780 Nairobi.
- 781 UNEP FI. (2019). *Driving Finance Today for the Climate Resilient Society of Tomorrow*. Report to
782 the Global Commission on Adaptation.

- 783 UNFCCC. (2022). *Regional approaches to adaptation planning and implementation*. UNFCCC
784 Least developed countries expert group.
- 785 Venner, K., García-Lamarca, M., & Olazabal, M. (2024). The multi-scalar inequities of climate
786 adaptation finance: a critical review. *Current Climate Change Reports*, 10(3), 46-59.
- 787 Watkiss, P., Butera, B., Canales, N., Chapagain, D., & Pauw, P. (2025). Adaptation finance gap. In
788 *Adaptation Gap Report 2025*.
- 789 Wolf, J., & Moser, S. C. (2011). Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with
790 climate change. *WIREs Climate Change*, 2(4), 547–569.
- 791 Yule, E. L., Donovan, K., & Graham, J. (2023). The challenges of implementing adaptation actions
792 in Scotland’s public sector. *Climate Services*, 32, 100412.
- 793 Zahnow, R., Yousefnia, A. R., Hassankhani, M., & Cheshmehzangi, A. (2025). Climate change
794 inequalities. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 165, 104021.

795

796

797

798 **Appendix 1 - Adaptation Investment Cycle Tasks.**

799 The Adaptation Investment Cycle (AIC) consists of six phases and 18 tasks that guide regions in
800 creating and executing Climate Resilience Investment Plans, with each phase supported by practical
801 resources, case studies, and succinct sub-tasks underpinned by enabling conditions for adaptation
802 finance, where all tasks are recommended though some are more critical or challenging than others..

803 **Phase 1 – Define regional context and objectives**

804 Establish the policy, financial, and investment context for adaptation. This includes aligning with

805 regional development goals, identifying financing criteria and partnerships, assessing historical and
806 future climate-related costs, and defining a preliminary budget and investment rationale.

807 **Phase 2 – Address strategic financing barriers**

808 Identify and diversify potential funding and financing sources. Assess existing instruments, explore
809 new opportunities, and define actions to overcome barriers to mobilising finance.

810 **Phase 3 – Develop pathways and investment packages**

811 Compile and prioritise adaptation options, organise them into sequenced pathways (short-, medium-
812 , and long-term), and structure them into investment-ready packages.

813 **Phase 4 – Economic appraisal and finance matchmaking**

814 Assess the economic and financial viability of proposed actions and align projects with appropriate
815 funding and financing sources.


816 **Phase 5 – Structure bankable investments**

817 Develop tailored business models, financing arrangements, and delivery structures for projects
818 requiring more complex financial solutions.

819 **Phase 6 – Monitoring, evaluation and learning**

820 Define indicators, monitor and report progress (including private sector involvement), and integrate
821 lessons learned into future planning cycles.

822 **Figure 3. Adaptation Investment Cycle Tasks.**



823

824 Source: England et al., 2026.