Working Paper : 1519


Authors Petrohilos-Andrianos, Y. and Xepapadeas, A.
Title Environmental Policy: The Coevolution of Pollution and Compliance
Abstract We study the evolution of compliance of firms in a setup of taxable emissions. Firms can either choose to comply with the emissions rule or violate it. Violation is considered either as a single option or is let to vary between low and high emissions, inducing a different level of fine if the firm gets caught. The firms can switch between strategies according to an evolutionary proportional rule and the conditions for stability are investigated accounting for two distinct types of probability of inspection.
Creation Date 2015-12-07
Keywords Emission taxes, compliance, replicator dynamics.
File The.Coevolution.of.Pollution.and.Compliance.pdf (445512 bytes)
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