| Authors |
Bakaouka, E. and Milliou, C. |
| Title |
Vertical Licensing, Input Pricing, and Entry |
| Abstract |
We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent firm to license the production technology of its core input to an external firm. We find that it opts for licensing even when licensing induces the entry of the licensee in the final goods market. In fact, although the entry of the licensee reduces the licensor's efficiency and the competition that it faces, it reinforces, instead of weakens, the licensing incentives. Vertical licensing is always welfare-enhancing and it is even more welfare-enhancing when it triggers entry. |
| Creation Date |
2016-12-22 |
| Keywords |
licensing, vertical relations, entry, two-part tariffs, outsourcing |
| Classification JEL |
L22, L24, L13, L42, |
| File |
Vertical.Licensing.Input.Pricing.and.Entry.pdf (570040 bytes) |
| File-Function |
First version |
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Copyright © 2009 [D.I.E.S.S. A.U.E.B.]. All rights reserved.
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